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Abstract
Consumer information on products aﬀects competition and proﬁts. We analyze
ﬁrms’ decisions to impart product information through advertising: comparative ad-
v e r t i s i n ga l s oa l l o w st h e mt oi m p a r ti n f ormation about rivals’ products. If ﬁrms sell
products of similar qualities, both want to advertise detailed product information that
enables consumers to determine their matches: there is no role for comparative ad-
vertising. If qualities are suﬃciently dissimilar, the high-quality one will not want to
disclose match information. If legal, the low-quality ﬁrm rival would like to adver-
tise match information about its rival. Such “comparative” advertising may have a
detrimental impact on welfare by leading more consumers to consume the low quality
product: this eﬀect can dominate the beneﬁts from improved consumer information
and reduce social welfare if qualities are diﬀerent enough.
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Until the late 1990s, mentioning a competitor’s brand in an ad was illegal in many EU coun-
tries. This situation was ended by a 1997 EU directive that made “comparative advertising”
legal subject to the restriction that it should not be misleading. This brought the European
approach closer to that of the FTC in the US. In other countries, comparative advertising re-
mains illegal, or little used (see Donthu, 1998, for a cross-country comparison). The rationale
for a favorable attitude towards “comparative advertising” on the part of competition au-
thorities is that it improves the consumers’ information about available products and prices
(see Barigozzi and Peitz, 2005, for details and a wealth of examples and discussion). This
raises a number of questions for the economic analysis of informative advertising. What is
the scope of a practice that involves disclosing information that the product’s supplier would
choose not to reveal? Is the beneﬁt to consumers from improved information mitigated by
a welfare loss for competitors who are (presumably) hurt by comparative advertising about
their products? Are consumers hurt by higher prices because product diﬀerentiation rises
due to comparative advertising about product attributes?
Here we consider a game between rival ﬁrms and their incentives to provide information.
Consumers do not know the characteristics of a ﬁrm’s product unless they are revealed
through advertising, although consumers have (correct) priors about their evaluations. Firms
are fully aware of each other’s product attributes. If comparative advertising is not permitted,
then ﬁrms can only inform consumers about their own goods. If comparative advertising
is permitted, the other ﬁrm can also inform consumers about product attributes that its
rival might not wish to communicate. The analysis also treats the welfare economics of
comparative advertising.
Evaluating the impact of comparative advertising on market outcome requires identifying
situations where the possibility of comparative advertising changes the information available
1to consumers. In other words, there must be some information that ﬁrms would not disclose
if restricted to direct advertising, and that will be brought out if comparative advertising is
allowed. In much of the literature on informative advertising, sending ads is costly and it
is the cost of advertising that limits the information transmission by ﬁrms (see the seminal
papers of Butters, 1977, Grossman and Shapiro, 1984, and the review coverage in Bagwell,
2006). Anderson and Renault (2006) explore the possibility that a monopoly ﬁrm might
choose to provide limited information about its product attributes even if advertising has
no cost. This result is a starting point for the present paper because it identiﬁes situations
where a ﬁrm is hurt by information disclosure about its own product, so that there might
be some incentives for competitors to provide that information through comparative ads.
The paper is novel in several dimensions. First, it contributes to the economics of asymmet-
ric oligopolistic competition, indicating how quality-cost advantages feed into equilibrium
prices and sales. Second, it provides results on the impact of increased product information
on market outcomes: while more information tends to increase proﬁts, and welfare when
qualities are similar, welfare can be harmed with more information due to price distortions
when qualities are quite diﬀerent. Third, it provides some predictions on when comparative
advertising might be used — by smaller ﬁrms with cost or quality disadvantages.
There is curiously little economics literature on comparative advertising, although in
marketing there is quite a lot of documentation of the phenomenon, and discussion of its
eﬀectiveness (see Grewal et al., 1997, for a comprehensive survey).1 Barigozzi and Peitz
(2005) give a survey and some background modeling of alternative approaches. Barigozzi,
Garella, and Peitz (2006) take a signalling approach. An entrant with uncertain quality
confronts an incumbent whose quality is known. The entrant chooses between “generic”
advertising, which is standard money burning to signal quality (as in Nelson, 1974), and
1A recent paper by Thompson and Hamilton (2006) shows subjects four diﬀerent ads, with diﬀerent
comparative and analytical cues and judges ad eﬀectiveness by surveying participants’ impressions.
2“comparative” advertising, which involves a claim comparing the two ﬁrms’ qualities. Firms
may have favorable or unfavorable information about the entrant’s quality but do not observe
it perfectly. If comparative advertising is used, the incumbent may litigate in the hope of
obtaining damages if the court, which may observe quality perfectly, ﬁn d st h a ti ti sl o w .
Comparative advertising may credibly signal favorable information about entrant quality
because a ﬁrm holding such information expects that it is unlikely that a court will ﬁnd that
its quality is low. Aluf and Shy (2001) model comparative advertising (using a Hotelling-
type model of product diﬀerentiation) as shifting the transport cost to the rival’s product.
While this is an interesting angle in its own right, the modeling approach does not capture
the informative aspect of comparison advertising and is not micro-founded in information
revelation. Instead, it seems more like a model of (negative) “persuasive” advertising.
We consider the disclosure of horizontally diﬀerentiated attributes that are valued diﬀer-
ently by diﬀerent consumers assuming that product qualities are known. If product qualities
are suﬃciently diﬀerent, the equilibrium to the disclosure game has only the ﬁrm with the
low quality disclosing horizontal attributes and the high one not. If comparative advertising
is allowed, then the low-quality ﬁrm will disclose the horizontal attributes of both products
(and so it is truly comparative).
Section 2 gives useful general results for Bertrand duopoly with product diﬀerentiation.
We outline the model in Section 3, describe demand under diﬀerent degrees of product
information, and ﬁnd the corresponding equilibrium prices. The outcomes are compared in
Section 4. The equilibrium information disclosure is determined in Section 5, and Section
6 shows how the results also cover two alternative formulations of the basic model (search
goods and quality revelation). Section 7 concludes. The longer proofs are collected in the
Appendix.
32 Some preliminary results
We ﬁrst give some results for duopoly pricing that are important to the analysis that follows.
S i n c et h e ya r eu s e dq u i t ee x t e n s i v e l y ,w eg i v et h e mﬁrst. The demand curves considered
below will satisfy the properties used in these results. The results pertain quite generally to
diﬀerentiated product Bertrand duopoly with covered markets.
Consider a duopoly where ﬁrms 0 and 1 set prices p0 and p1.D e ﬁne ∆ as Firm 1’s net
quality advantage, ∆ = p0 − p1 + Q,w h e r eQ ∈ IR may be understood as a Firm 1’s gross
quality advantage. Demand for Firm i’s product is given by Di(∆), i =0 ,1,w h e r eD1 is an
increasing function taking values in [0,1] deﬁned on IR. Further assume that D0 =1− D1,
which may be understood as a covered market assumption: if heterogenous consumers have
unit demands, each consumer must buy either product (and total demand is normalized to
1). Production costs are assumed to be zero (though the model may be reinterpreted to
allow for positive and diﬀerent production costs as explained below).
Assume that D1(0) = D0(0) = 1
2 so that, if Q =0and ﬁrms charge the same price, they
share demand equally. Thus, Q =0may be viewed as a symmetric case, whereas when Q 6=0 ,
one ﬁrm has a competitive advantage over the other one in the sense that it may charge a
larger price than its competitor and still serve at least half the market (Firm 1 having the
competitive advantage if Q>0 and Firm 0 having the competitive advantage when Q<0).
This competitive advantage is presented for the exposition as a quality diﬀerence, but could
also be (and is formally equivalent to) a marginal production cost diﬀerence (marginal costs
being constant). To see this, simply reinterpret pi as a mark-up over marginal cost. More
generally the ﬁrm with the competitive advantage is the one that has the larger diﬀerence
between its quality and its marginal cost.2
2To see this, let c0 and c1 denote ﬁrms’ (constant) marginal costs, and deﬁne mi = pi − ci as Firm
i’s mark-up. Redeﬁne Q =( q1 − c1) − (q0 − c0) and set ∆ = m0 − m1 + Q. Then Firm 1’s proﬁti s
π1 = m1D1 (∆) and now view ﬁrms as choosing their mark-ups. Hence the formal analysis is unaﬀected:
note that ∆ = q1−p1−(q0 − p0) so that the demand functions are just as before. The advantaged ﬁrm is now
4We ﬁrst establish a general result characterizing Firm 1’s equilibrium net competitive
advantage, ∆, and how it relates to the gross competitive advantage Q.
Lemma 1 Assume D0 =1− D1,a n dD1(∆)=1
2 if and only if ∆ =0 .T h e ni na n yp u r e
strategy Nash equilibrium of the game where prices are chosen simultaneously, ∆ has the sign
of Q and
0 ≤ |∆| ≤ |Q|
with equality only if Q =0 .
Lemma 1 is proved in the Appendix using revealed preference arguments. The next result
follows directly.
Corollary 1 If Q =0 ,t h e np0 = p1 and D0 = D1 in equilibrium.
If Q>0,t h e np0 <p 1 and D0 <D 1 in equilibrium.
This states that whichever ﬁrm has a competitive advantage retains that advantage in
equilibrium and thus has higher demand (∆ has the same sign as Q)b u tt h i sa d v a n t a g ei s
somewhat mitigated because the weaker ﬁrm charges a lower price (|∆| < |Q| if Q 6=0 ). It
also states that in the symmetric case where Q =0 , ﬁrms must share the market equally.
The present results extend those of Anderson and de Palma (2001), who show such properties
hold with the multinomial logit demand model (and n ≥ 2 competing ﬁrms).
We now put some additional structure on demand in order to tighten the characterization
of equilibrium pricing.
Assumption 1 There exist two, possibly inﬁnite, real numbers ∆  and ∆u such that D1(∆)=
0 if and only if ∆ ≤ ∆  and D1(∆)=1if and only if ∆ ≥ ∆u.F u r t h e r m o r e ,D1 is diﬀer-
entiable on [∆ ,∆u] and D0
1 > 0 on (∆ ,∆u).
seen as the one with the higher quality-cost, and all results that follow can be appropriately re-interpreted.
5Since D1 is increasing and D1(0) = 1
2,w em u s th a v e∆  < 0 < ∆u. The diﬀerentiability
assumption does not rule out a non-diﬀerentiable point of D1 at either bound but merely
guarantees that there is a right derivative at ∆  and a left derivative at ∆u. Henceforth we
use D0
1 (∆ ) and D0
1 (∆u) to denote inside derivatives at these points. As we will see below,
diﬀerentiability of D1 at ∆  or ∆u has important implications for the market outcome.




1(∆).S i n c e∆ = p0−p1+Q
and D0 =1−D1,t h ed e r i v a t i v e so fe a c hﬁrm’s demands with respect to the ﬁrm’s own price
are equal and given by −D
0
1(∆).
For ∆ ∈ (∆ ,∆u), equilibrium prices must satisfy standard ﬁrst-order conditions setting

















From equation (1) we derive a simple ﬁxed point condition that fully characterizes ∆ as a







recalling that ∆ = p0 − p1 + Q,w et h e nh a v e
Q = ∆ − g(∆). (3)
In order for equations (1) and (3) to be relevant, it is necessary that in equilibrium ∆
falls strictly between ∆  and ∆u.A sw ep r o v ei nt h eA p p e n d i x ,t h i sw i l lb et h ec a s ef o ra l l
Q,i fD1 is diﬀerentiable at ∆  and ∆u, which means if the inside derivatives are zero there.
3Equation (1) also yields a quick proof (given diﬀerentiability) for Lemma 1 and its Corollary. When
both demands are positive, the ﬁrst-order conditions are pi =
−Di(∆)
D0
i(∆) (as per (1)). Since in any equilibrium,
D0
0 (∆)=−D0
1 (∆), then higher prices are associated to higher demands. But this means that, since we
have D0 (0) = 1/2,t h eﬁrm with the lower demand has a higher net quality. That is, p0 <p 1 holds if and
only if D0 <D 1 and if and only if ∆ > 0.T a k i n g t h e ﬁrst and last inequalities, this can be only true if
q1 >q 0 (Q>0). The equality results follow immediately along similar lines. This result means intuitively
that a quality (or cost) advantage is reﬂected in a higher mark-up and yet higher demand since the quality
advantage is only partially oﬀset with a higher price.
6Lemma 2 Under Assumption 1, in any pure strategy Nash equilibrium, ∆ ∈ [∆ ,∆u].F u r -
thermore, if for some k ∈ { ,u}, D1 is diﬀerentiable at ∆k,t h e n∆ 6= ∆k for all Q ∈ IR.
The above results characterize the equilibrium provided that it exists. Further regular-
ity conditions must be imposed on D1 to guarantee existence as well as uniqueness of an
equilibrium. We thus assume the following.
Assumption 2 D1and D0 are strictly log-concave on [∆ ,∆u].
This means that lnDi is strictly concave, so D0
i/Di is strictly decreasing.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the game in which ﬁrms choose prices simul-
taneously has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium, such that p0, p1,a n d∆ satisfy
1. If ∆  − 1
D
0
1(∆ ) <Q<∆u + 1
D
0
1(∆u),t h e n∆ is given by (3) and p0 and p1 are given by
(1). Furthermore ∆ is strictly increasing in Q with d∆
dQ < 1.
2. If Q ≤ ∆  − 1
D
0
1(∆ ),t h e n∆ = ∆ , p1 =0and p0 = ∆  − Q.
3. If Q ≥ ∆u + 1
D
0
1(∆u),t h e n∆ = ∆u, p0 =0and p1 = Q − ∆u.
Thus, whether or not equilibrium entails positive demands for both ﬁrms for all Q boils
down to whether or not the demand derivative is zero at the point where one demand becomes
zero. To see this, suppose there is a zero derivative at (a ﬁnite) ∆u (of course, the argument
also holds for an inﬁnite ∆u but the ﬁnite case is more striking and bears better juxtaposition
with the case of a ﬁnite derivative). Then even for very high Q i tw i l ln o tb ew o r t hF i r m1
pricing out Firm 0 from the market when p0 =0 , because the mass of last customers to get
on board becomes vanishingly small at a high price (approaching Q−∆u) and loses revenue
on the existing consumer base. With a ﬁnite derivative, the trade-oﬀ becomes attractive at
a high enough quality.
7Corollary 2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, whenever Firm 1’s demand is strictly positive,
its proﬁt is strictly increasing in Q and whenever Firm 0’s demand is strictly positive, its
proﬁt is strictly decreasing in Q.
Proof. From Proposition 1, the equilibrium ∆ is increasing in Q and strictly increasing
in case 1.S i n c eD1 is increasing in ∆, D1 is increasing in Q and D0 is decreasing in Q.
To complete the proof it suﬃces to show that p1 is strictly increasing in Q whenever
D1 > 0 and p0 is strictly decreasing in Q whenever D0 > 0. This is immediate in cases 2 and
3.I nc a s e1 prices are given by Equation (1). Since D1 and D0 a r ea s s u m e dt ob es t r i c t l y
log-concave, p1 is strictly increasing in ∆ and p0 is strictly decreasing in ∆ which proves the
result since ∆ is strictly increasing in Q in case 1.
3 The model
Consumers are interested in buying one unit of one of two goods, which are sold by separate
ﬁrms. The intrinsic beneﬁt of the product class is large enough that all consumers buy one
of the two products. Each product’s speciﬁcation is summarized by consumer valuations,
which are assumed independently, identically, and symmetrically distributed around zero
with density f (.), distribution function F (.),a n ds u p p o r t[−b,b]. Hence f (x)=f (−x) and
F (0) = 1/2. We write consumer utility as
ui = qi − pi + ri,i =1 ,2, (4)
where qi is product i’s quality, pi its price, and ri is the consumer’s match value. We consider
an experience good so purchases depend only on expectations of match values.4
4In Section 6 we show that the basic results hold in a variant on the model in which we allow consumers
to acquire the missing information through search in a setting that is similar to that used in Wolinsky (1986)
and Anderson and Renault (1999) and (2000).
8Consumers observe prices (for example, in the store where purchases are made). They
also know qualities: this can either be viewed as a direct assumption or else it follows
from the analysis of Section 6 that if qualities are unknown to consumers, ﬁrms will reveal
them in equilibrium (this is an extension of the basic “persuasion game” of Milgrom, 1981).
However, absent advertising, consumers do not know their match valuations. Firms are able
to advertise their own product speciﬁcation if they so wish. Such “positive” advertising will
allow consumers to know their realizations of ri.I fﬁrms are allowed to advertise rival product
speciﬁcations, either they only do that (“negative advertising”) and consumers know their
realizations of rj,o re l s eaﬁrm can advertise both product speciﬁcations, so consumers then
know both ri and rj, a situation we refer to as “comparative advertising.” Even though there
is nothing untruthful in comparative or negative advertising, this may be information that
Firm i may choose not to reveal on its own. If there is no information on Firm i’s product
speciﬁcation (and hence the value of ri), consumers must form expectations of their beneﬁts
from buying from Firm i. Consumers cannot otherwise acquire any information through
search. An alternative phrasing of the model with a search good instead of an experience
good is shown in Section 6 to give rise to an equivalent formulation as long as the search
cost is high enough.
We next describe demand under the alternative consumer information states that might
arise from advertising.
3.1 No information
If neither ﬁrm advertises, the consumers know only the expected value from purchasing from
either of them. Since the mean match value is zero (by the assumption of symmetry of f),
expected utility is
ui = qi − pi.
9Products are ex-ante homogenous except for the quality diﬀerential. Firm 1’s demand
is then zero if ∆ < 0,a n do n ei f∆ > 0.I f∆ =0 ,w ei n v o k eas t a n d a r dt i e - b r e a k i n gr u l e
that assigns all demand to Firm 1: since we assume Q ≥ 0, this corresponds to “eﬃcient
rationing” when Q>0, and has no bite when Q =0 .
The price equilibrium under no information is quite straightforward. It follows from
a standard Bertrand equilibrium argument that the low quality ﬁrm sets a zero price in
equilibrium and the high-quality one serves the whole market at a price of Q.5 Since the
market size is normalized to unity, Q is also Firm 1’s equilibrium proﬁt.
3.2 One-sided information
Here we characterize the demand (indicated with a bar) that ensues when the information
advertised concerns only one of the products (for example, only one ﬁrm advertises its
product speciﬁcation).
Suppose that Firm 0’s match is known. Then, since the expected match value with Firm
1 is zero, the relevant utilities are
u0 = q0 − p0 + r0
and
u1 = q1 − p1.
These expressions give rise to a demand facing Firm 1 given by Pr(u0 <u 1) or
¯ D1 =P r( r0 < ∆)=F (∆). (5)
Since the support of r0, the random variable underlying F (.),i s[−b,b] we have here that
5Without further restriction, any price premium of Q with the price of the high quality ﬁrm between 0
and Q, is an equilibrium outcome to this game. Anderson and de Palma (1987) show that the equilibrium we
select is the unique limit of equilibria in a horizontally diﬀerentiated market, as product heterogeneity goes
to zero. This rules out equilibria where the low-quality ﬁrm (which makes no sales) prices below marginal
cost.
10¯ D1 (∆)=1for ∆ ≥ ∆u = b,a n d ¯ D1 (∆)=0for ∆ ≤ ∆l = −b,a n dA s s u m p t i o n s1a n d2
are satisﬁed for this demand. Hence Proposition 1 holds.
We now argue the allocation of consumers to ﬁrms in such a situation is independent of
which ﬁrm’s match values are known (so the result is the same). Indeed, if Firm 1’s match
is known and Firm 0’s match is unknown, the utilities relevant to choices are u0 = q0 − p0
and u1 = q1 − p1 + r1. The demand facing Firm 1 is then ¯ D1 =1− F (−∆).H o w e v e r ,t h i s
demand expression is the same as (5) since symmetry of f implies F (x)=1− F (−x).I n
summary:
Lemma 3 If advertising is one-sided, a ﬁrm’s demand does not depend on which ﬁrm’s
match values are known.
Thus it makes no diﬀerence which ﬁrm’s matches are advertised (given only one ﬁrm’s
are). This means there is no systematic bias in the model to favor negative or positive
advertising.
Under one-sided information, from the analysis of Section 2, whether or not one ﬁrm is
excluded from the market in equilibrium depends on whether Q is high enough and whether
the derivative of demand is positive or zero at the upper bound. Since that derivative is
simply f (b) (where b = ∆u in the earlier notation), then we immediately have the following
result as a corollary to Lemma 2 and Proposition 1.
Lemma 4 Suppose information is one-sided. Then equilibrium demands are both positive
regardless of Q if f (b)=0 .I f f (b) > 0, then for Q ≥ b + 1
f(b), Firm 1 serves the whole
market in equilibrium and sets a price p1 = Q − b;f o rl o w e rQ the market is shared and p0,
p1,a n d∆ are given by equations (1) and (3).
Proof. The result is a direct corollary of Proposition 1.
11Note that the case f (b)=0covers the case when the support of match values is the
extended real line. With a ﬁnite support and f (b) > 0, the quality-advantaged ﬁrm prices so
as to just retain the individual enjoying the highest regard for Firm 0, which is the individual
who has a match r0 = b. This compares to the mean value of 0 for Firm 1.6
3.3 Full information
Consumers know exactly their match values with both products if they have been advertised.
A consumer with full information purchases product 1 if and only if
q1 − p1 + r1 ≥ q0 − p0 + r0
or equivalently
r1 + ∆ ≥ r0.
The probability a consumer with a given realization of r1 buys from Firm 1 is F (r1 + ∆).




F (r1 + ∆)f (r1)dr1 (6)
and e D0(∆)=1− e D1(∆), where full-information demands are characterized with a tilde.7
The range of values of ∆ for which e D1(∆) is strictly between 0 and 1 is from ∆l = −2b
to ∆u =2 b, and Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed for this demand. These bounds arise
because these are the values for which at least some value of F (r1 + ∆) in (6) is neither
zero or one. For example, if ∆ =2 b, even the consumer who least likes product 1 and most
6Equivalently, as per Lemma 3, if Firm 1 reveals its match information while Firm 0 does not, 1 must
price so that the consumer least enamoured of it (holding r1 = −b) nonetheless buys against an expected
value of 0 with Firm 0.
7By Lemma 1 we can concentrate on the case ∆ ≥ 0. Then (6) becomes ˜ D1 (∆)= R b−∆
−b F (r1 + ∆)f (r1)dr1 +1−F (b − ∆). Demand can be visualized as the area of the unit square of con-
sumer valuations accorded to each ﬁrm. The division line (indiﬀerent consumer type) satisﬁes r1 = r0 − ˜ ∆,
which is a diagonal line. If ˜ ∆ > 0,F i r m1 attracts all those consumers for whom r0 < ˜ ∆ irrespective of their
valuation of r1: hence the ﬁnal term in the demand function.
12likes product zero (that is, (r0,r 1)=( b,−b)) will just switch to buying product 1 because its
net quality advantage is so high. Nonetheless, even though the demand function itself has a
b o u n da b o v ew h i c hi ti so n e( f o rb ﬁnite), we shall see below (using Proposition 1), that in
equilibrium demand will always be below one.
We ﬁrst use Lemma 1 above to characterize the equilibrium outcome under perfect in-
formation that will prevail if information about both ﬁrms’ products are disclosed through
advertising.
Although this demand function has the whole market served by Firm 1 if ∆ ≥ 2b,t h i s
never happens in equilibrium. This property is a direct corollary of Lemma 2 and Proposition
1. Since for ∆ > 0 we can write (6) as e D1(∆)=
R b−∆




−b f (r1 + ∆)f (r1)dr1 a n dt h i se x p r e s s i o ni sz e r of o r∆ =2 b. This puts
us always in Case 1 of Proposition 1.
Lemma 5 Suppose information is perfect. Then equilibrium demands are positive regardless
of Q. Equivalently, the equilibrium ∆ is always below 2b and p0, p1,a n d∆ are given by
equations (1) and (3).
Proof. This corresponds to Case 1 in Proposition 1, namely that ∆ < ∆u in equilibrium.
Even though Firm 1 has the ability to price 0 out of the market, it never exercises the
option because the marginal gain in consumers is so small even when the stakes (the price)
are very large.
3.4 Comparing demands
We now establish a result which will be used later for the asymmetric cases, and helps build
intuition for the results. The expressions compared are demands under full and one-sided
13information (see (5) and (6)).8




F(r1 + ∆)f(r1)dr1 ≤ F(∆)= ¯ D1 (∆)
if and only if ∆ ≥ 0, with equality if and only if ∆ =0 .
This result is suggestive of forces at play in the equilibrium disclosure analysis, but it is
not conclusive because the comparison of demands treats ∆ as ﬁx e dr a t h e rt h a nd e t e r m i n e d
at its equilibrium value in the information state. The Proposition already suggests that Firm
0i sb e t t e ro ﬀ when information is full because it has higher demand for given ∆ > 0 (i.e.,
e D0 (∆) > ¯ D0 (∆)). However, it is less clear whether the equilibrium ∆ also favors it under
full information, but one might suspect that it could support a higher price insofar as full
information (loosely) means greater perceived product diﬀerentiation. Conversely though,
Firm 1 might be expected to be reticent to reveal information because of the ﬁrst eﬀect: a
less attractive demand for given ∆.
For ∆ = Q, Proposition 2 provides some insight into the nature of the ineﬃciency when
information is only one-sided. This corresponds to ﬁrst-best pricing (where prices are equal)
and full information then yields the ﬁrst-best allocation. If only one product is known
there is some welfare loss because a consumer may end up choosing the wrong product and
Proposition 2 indicates that this inappropriate matching biases demand in favor of the high
quality product. This is to be contrasted with the impact of equilibrium pricing, which
distorts the allocation of consumers in favor of the low quality product, which is cheaper
whether information is full or one-sided. Which informational state yields the higher social
8This inequality is related to Jensen’s inequality. We compare the expected value of some functional
transformation of a random variable with the value of that function evaluated at the expected value of the
random variable; Jensen’s inequality compares these quantities under a convexity assumption on the func-
tional whereas we consider a functional that is ﬁrst convex and then concave. For the uniform distribution,
F(r+∆) is peicewise linear and a quick proof of the result may be obtained by applying Jensen’s inequality.
14surplus depends on the interaction of these two countervailing ineﬃciencies. We therefore
turn to comparing the price sub-games.
4 Equilibrium pricing under diﬀerent information states
We assume that the match density function, f, is log-concave. Using arguments from Caplin
and Nalebuﬀ (1991), this guarantees that Assumption 2 holds so that existence and unique-
ness under one-sided or full information follows from Proposition 1.
4.1 Equal qualities and information
We ﬁrst compare equilibrium prices under symmetry of qualities (q0 = q1). If there is no
information, products are viewed as perfect substitutes and a standard Bertrand argument
gives them both equal to marginal cost, which we recall is zero.
With one-sided information, demand for Firm 1 is given by (5)) which, for Q =0yields
¯ D1 = F (p0 − p1).T h u sd e m a n df o rF i r m0i s¯ D0 =1− ¯ D1 =1−F(p0 −p1).U s i n gL e m m a
1, ∆ =0 ; by Proposition 1, prices are equal (to 1





With full information, a consumer holding a value r1 for product 1 (and r0 for product 0)
prefers 1 with probability F (p0 − p1 + r1). Integrating up over all possible values of r1 gives
e D1 =
R b
−b F (p0 − p1 + r1)f (r1)dr1 (see also (6)). Again from Lemma 2 and Proposition 1,
both prices are equal to 1







These prices are compared below.
Proposition 3 If q0 = q1, then equilibrium prices are higher under full information than
under one-sided information than under no information. The uniform density is a limit case
for which prices are the same for full and one-sided information.




2 (r)dr ≤ f (0)
Z b
−b
f (r)dr = f (0),
or, from (7) and (8), ¯ p ≤ e p. Equality is only attained with a uniform density, so then prices
are equal. Otherwise, we have ¯ p<e p. Since demand is split 50—50, proﬁts are also higher
(unless f is uniform) under full information. Both prices exceed the zero price under no
information.
With equal qualities, proﬁts are simply equal to half the equilibrium prices. This makes
t h ec a s et h a tm o r ep r o d u c ti n f o r m a t i o ni sb e t t e rf o rﬁrms (see also Meurer and Stahl, 1994).
Full match information (again under equal qualities) is also the information state that gives
the highest total welfare. This is because there is no allocation distortion due to unequal
prices, and full information enables consumers to reach the ﬁrst-best solution that each
consumer buys her highest match.
The symmetric quality case underscores the product diﬀerentiation advantage imparted
by full information over limited information. However, the result that a higher degree of
product diﬀerentiation delivers higher equilibrium prices may have a downside in an extended
model. Higher prices may make consumers worse oﬀ. It may also even lead to welfare losses
if the model is broadened to allow for non-purchase. This is one potential strike against the
beneﬁts of informative advertising generally (and not just comparative advertising.)
In conclusion, a symmetric setting does not deliver a distinctive role for comparative
advertising. Nor does it enable much useful welfare debate about the welfare beneﬁts of
comparative advertising. For that, we turn to the case of quite diﬀerent qualities.
4.2 Asymmetric qualities and information
When qualities are diﬀerent there are diﬀerent incentives to ﬁrms to reveal information.
16Proposition 4 Let b be ﬁnite with f (b) > 0. Then for Q large enough, no information
gives a higher proﬁt level for Firm 1 than one-sided information.
Proof. In the case of one-sided information, for Q l a r g ee n o u g hw eh a v eF i r m1s e r v -
ing the whole market in the equilibrium to the price sub-game (by Lemma 4). Under no
information, Firm 1 also serves the whole market. So it remains to compare prices across
information structures. In both cases, Firm 0 sets a price of 0. Under no information, Firm
1’s price is simply its quality advantage, Q. With one-sided information, its price guarantees
all consumers prefer it, and so p1 = Q − b, which is clearly smaller.
This Proposition highlights the possibility that information withholding may beneﬁt
ﬁrms. The property extends to other information states.
Proposition 5 Let b be ﬁnite with f (b) > 0.T h e n f o r Q large enough, one-sided infor-
mation gives a higher proﬁt level for Firm 1 and a lower proﬁt level for Firm 0 than full
information.
Proof. Under one-sided information, Firm 1’s price is Q − b for Q large enough (see




with a ∆ that satisﬁes ∆ = Q − g(∆) (see (3)), and it serves less than all consumers.
For Q large enough, the appropriate value of ∆ tends to b (from below). Therefore, it
suﬃces for full information to give lower proﬁtt h a tQ − b ≥
e D1(∆)
e D0
1(∆) as ∆ approaches b along
the appropriate path (i.e., given that ∆ = Q − g(∆)). Since both prices tend to inﬁnity,
consider their derivatives with respect to Q as Q gets large, and the one with the greater
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17(3) that d∆
dQ = 1




















































1(∆) e D1(∆).A s ∆ tends to b, we want to show that the Left-Hand Side
approaches some number below 1. Now, e D1 (∆) tends to 1 as ∆ approaches b,a n dΩ(∆) is
negative (since e D00
1 (∆) < 0 for ∆ close enough to b), which proves the result.
Finally, Firm 0 earns zero under one-sided information for high enough Q (since it has
no market), but it always earns positive proﬁts under full information.
What this means is that the quality advantaged ﬁrm may want to hold back information
and keep consumers uniformed. Nevertheless, the other ﬁrm’s incentives lie in the opposite
direction. Comparative advertising can permit this ﬁrm to reach its preferred information
state.
5 Equilibrium information disclosure
We can now address the equilibrium advertising strategies starting with the case when com-
parative and negative advertising are debarred. Firms are viewed as setting advertising
content before the price sub-game is resolved, so there is a two-stage game in ad content
and then pricing. In the context of consumers going to the store for a pain reliever, they see
all ads before going, and they see all prices on arrival. If they have no information about a
product’s attributes, they use the expected match value of zero. Otherwise, they know the
match value communicated from any ads. Recall that advertising is costless.
18Proposition 6 Suppose that Q>0 is small enough. Then with comparative advertising de-
barred, the only equilibrium involves each ﬁrm revealing its match. This is still an equilibrium
when comparative advertising is allowable.
Proof. For Q =0 , for any distribution apart from the uniform, from Proposition 3, each
ﬁrm’s proﬁt is strictly higher when it reveals information than when it does not, regardless
of the strategy of the other ﬁrm. By continuity, this property still holds for Q>0 small
enough, hence the equilibrium stated is unique. For the uniform, the analysis in the Appendix
shows both ﬁrms strictly better oﬀ revealing than not (see also the diagrams in the section
below). Both revealing own matches is still an equilibrium when the comparative advertising
is allowed since all information is revealed by the ﬁrms separately, and so there is no extra
information to be revealed.
The uniqueness of equilibrium with comparative advertising debarred also holds for Q =0
except for the uniform density. The uniform admits other equilibria since ﬁrms are indiﬀerent
between one-sided and full information (see Proposition 3). In particular, either one alone
revealing is also an equilibrium.
Corollary 3 The optimal revelation is implemented in equilibrium for Q close enough to 0.
Proof. In equilibrium, all information is revealed. This is optimal, given ﬁrm pricing,
because in the neighborhood of Q =0prices are arbitrarily close so that the consumer
allocation is arbitrarily close to optimal. This indeed ensures the full social optimum is
arbitrarily close to being attained.
In this case there is no special role for comparative advertising and also no role for
expanding (or restricting) advertising. Matters are diﬀerent for high Q.
Proposition 7 Suppose that Q is large enough and f (b) > 0. Then with comparative
advertising debarred, equilibrium involves neither ﬁrm revealing its match.
19Proof. From Propositions 4 and 5, Firm 1’s proﬁti sh i g h e rw h e ni td o e sn o tr e v e a l
its match information than when it does, regardless of the strategy of Firm 0 (note that if
Firm 0 does not reveal, Firm 1 is better oﬀ not revealing because it serves the entire market
in both cases and price is higher when not revealing since it does not need to get on board
the consumer most disliking it). Given Firm 1 does not reveal, Firm 0 gets zero proﬁts
regardless; by the advertising tie-breaking rule, it will not reveal.
Note that Firm 0’s incentive not to disclose any information is weak: it is indiﬀerent
between revealing and not revealing because in any case it is kept out of the market. The
possibility of resorting to comparative advertising changes the situation quite strikingly.
Proposition 8 Suppose that Q is large enough and f (b) > 0. Then with comparative
advertising allowed, the only equilibrium involves comparative advertising by Firm 0, which
reveals all information of both products.
Proof. Each ﬁrm revealing only its own information is not an equilibrium because
Firm 1 would prefer not to reveal. If Firm 1 does not reveal, then Firm 0 reveals all
information, by Proposition 4. Firm 1 then reveals nothing (by the tie breaking rule). If
Firm 0 revealed only its own information, Firm 1 would reveal nothing, but then Firm 0
would use comparative advertising, which is therefore an equilibrium. it remains to consider
negative advertising. Both will not use it because then Firm 1 would withdraw (preferring
one-sided to full information). Firm 0 will not use it alone because it prefers full information,
and hence comparative advertising. Firm 1 will not use it alone because Firm 0 would also
then use it (whereupon Firm 1 would withdraw).
Corollary 4 Welfare is lower when comparative advertising is allowed for Q large enough
and f (b) > 0.
Proof. This result follows from Proposition 8 because welfare is lower under full infor-
mation than for one-sided information for Q large enough. To see that welfare is lower, it
20suﬃces to note that the welfare optimum stipulates that all consumers should be allocated
to Firm 1 if its quality advantage exceeds the maximum diﬀerence in match values, i.e.,
Q ≥ 2b,w h i c hm u s th o l df o rQ large enough.
Comparative advertising leads to full information revelation, and this is harmful to wel-
fare. This is not because full information yields higher prices. Indeed, with quality asym-
metries, prices can be higher under one-sided information than full information, as seen for
the uniform example below. This means that consumers may nonetheless be better oﬀ with
comparative advertising. Furthermore, in this model, high prices are not intrinsically harm-
ful since there is no deadweight loss from non-purchase. It is not even the case that prices
are more distorted (in the sense of being more diﬀerent for given Q) under full information
than one-sided or no information. It is the interaction of the distortion with the information
structure that causes the welfare loss: from Proposition 2, one-sided information distorts
the allocation of consumers in favor of the high quality product and this outweighs the ad-
verse impact of equilibrium pricing that favors the low quality product whereas under full
information, price distortion is not is the only source of ineﬃciency.
The full range of outcomes for the uniform density is illustrated next.
5.1 Equilibrium proﬁts and equilibrium information disclosure;
uniform density
We give a full characterization of sub-game outcomes and the full equilibrium for the special
case of uniform density on [−1
2, 1
2] in the Appendix.
We2 ﬁrst compare ﬁrm pricing behavior under one-sided information disclosure with
that under full information. Assume ﬁrst that Q<3/2 so that Firm 0 retains some positive
market share in the one-sided equilibrium.9
From the general pricing formula (3), Firm 1’s equilibrium net quality advantage ∆ solves
9This bound comes from applying Proposition 1, Case 1: ∆u + 1
D
0
1(∆u) for the uniform is equa1 to 1
2 +1 .
21Q = ∆ − g(∆). The function g is deﬁned by (2) as g(∆)=1−2D1
D0
1 ,s ot h a t
¯ g(∆)=−2∆
for one-sided information transmission (recalling ¯ D1 (∆)=F(∆)=1




for full information (recalling e D1 (∆)=
R b
−b F(r +∆)f(r)dr which is 1+2∆−∆2
2 for ∆ ≥ 0). It
is readily veriﬁed that both ¯ g and ˜ g are strictly decreasing, and, furthermore, ¯ g>˜ g for the
relevant range of ∆ ∈ (0,1). These properties establish:
Lemma 6 For the uniform density and Q ≤ 3/2,p r i c ed i ﬀerences satisfy e ∆ < ¯ ∆.
This means that the extra product diﬀe r e n t i a t i o ni n v o l v e dw i t hf u l li n f o r m a t i o nr e v e l a t i o n
exacerbates price diﬀerences. Nonetheless, they still are less than the quality diﬀerence, as
per Lemma 1.
From the ﬁrst-order conditions under the two diﬀerent information structures, Firm 0’s





under one-sided information and
e p0 =
1 − e ∆
2
under full information disclosure, where ¯ ∆ and e ∆ are the corresponding equilibrium ∆’s.
Lemma 7 For the uniform density and Q ≤ 3/2, prices satisfy e p0 > ¯ p0 and e p1 > ¯ p1.
Proof. From the two price expressions given above, it is clear that e p0 > ¯ p0 (for given
∆ > 0). Furthermore, the two price expressions are decreasing in ∆ and since Lemma 6
shows in equilibrium, e ∆ < ¯ ∆,w em u s th a v ee p0 > ¯ p0 in equilibrium. Finally, in order for
e ∆ < ¯ ∆ we must also have e p1 > ¯ p1 in equilibrium.
22Thus, for Q ≤ 3
2,b o t hﬁrms charge higher prices when consumers know both products
than when they know only one.10 The above results may be used along with Proposition 2
to establish that the low quality Firm 0 is better oﬀ if both products are known.
Lemma 8 For the uniform density, proﬁts satisfy e π0 > ¯ π0.
Proof. Both demands for Firm 0 (with one-sided or full information) are decreasing in
∆ and, by Proposition 2, demand with full information is strictly larger for a given ∆ > 0.
Since, by Lemma 6, Firm 1’s net quality advantage, ∆, is lower under full information,
demand for Firm 0 is larger with full information. Furthermore, since it charges a higher
price, it earns a higher proﬁt.
T h ec o n v e r s et ot h ea r g u m e n ti nt h ep r o o fa b o v ei st h a td e m a n df o rt h eh i g hq u a l i t y
ﬁrm is lower with full information than when only one product is known. Since it charges a
higher price, with full information, equilibrium proﬁts for the high quality ﬁrm may not be
compared on the basis of the above results. We show below that the high quality ﬁrm also
prefers full information if Q is not too large but prefers one-sided information for Q large
enough.
Lemma 9 For the uniform density, there exists a quality value ˆ Q>3/2 such that proﬁts
satisfy e π1 > ¯ π1 for 0 <Q< ˆ Q and e π1 < ¯ π1 for Q> ˆ Q.
Proof. These properties are found by direct calculation given the values given in the
Appendix for prices in the various regimes.
Note that the large quality diﬀerence result is consistent with Proposition 5. The uniform
is rather special because proﬁts are equal under one-sided and full information when Q =0 .
As Q rises above zero, full information dominates one-sided information as regards Firm








8 . The proof in Lemma 7 holds more generally.
231’s proﬁts, and continues to do so whenever Firm 0’s equilibrium demand under one-sided
information is positive. Firm 1’s proﬁti n d i ﬀerence point happens for ˆ Q at which Firm 0
earns nothing under one-sided information. Hence for low Q the results of Proposition 6
apply, and those of Propositions 7 and 8 for large Q (above ˆ Q). In the interim, some extra
possibilities arise. These are discussed below.
The following Figures have Q on the horizontal axis and proﬁts on the vertical.











The upward-sloping lines are Firm 1’s proﬁts for no information (magenta), full infor-
mation (green), and one-sided information (blue). While full information always dominates
24one-sided information for parameter values such that 0 serves some market, no information
dominates both for a large quality advantage and loses to both for a small quality advan-
tage. The downward-sloping lines are Firm 0’s proﬁts, with full information (black) always
dominating one-sided information (red), which in turn always dominates no information (for
Q<3/2). T h en e x tF i g u r ez o o m si no nt h el o wQ values.










Equilibrium disclosure follows directly from these Figures. In particular, no information
is never an equilibrium for Q<3/2 because Firm 0 can provide information, generate
product diﬀerentiation and get a positive proﬁt. Indeed, it is a dominant strategy (given
equilibrium pricing in the sub-games) for 0 to provide information. Given that, Firm 1 will
25always want to provide information itself. So here there is full revelation, and no role for
negative or comparative advertising insofar as any equilibrium still entails full revelation.11
Now consider Q>3/2. The driver for the equilibrium is what happens to Firm 1’s proﬁt
between full information and one-sided information.12 As per Lemma 9, this depends on
which side of ˆ Q the quality diﬀerence Q lies. For Q> ˆ Q (which exceeds 3/2), the only
equilibrium is for there to be no advertising if comparative advertising is not permissible (as
per Proposition 7): it is a dominant strategy (among the pricing sub-games) for 1 to NOT
reveal, and, in response, since 0 gets nothing either way, it does not reveal either (by the
tie-break rule that favors less information over more in case of indiﬀerence). Otherwise, the






, equilibrium is driven by the twin properties that ¯ π1 < e π1 <π zero
1
and e π0 > ¯ π0 = πzero
0 (= 0). With comparative advertising debarred, one equilibrium has no
information provided, and another has both providing own match information. In the former
case, Firm 1 prefers no information to one-sided information and so does not advertise if
Firm 0 does not advertise, and Firm 0 will not advertise if Firm 1 does not. In the other
equilibrium, each ﬁrm prefers to advertise if the other advertises. Allowing now comparative
advertising, the latter is still an equilibrium, as is reciprocal negative advertising by the
same token. The former is not because Firm 0 would prefer comparative advertising, and
this comparative advertising is the other equilibrium.13 However, since Q>1,c o m p a r a t i v e
11With comparative advertising allowed, there is an equilibrium with each providing information about
matches with its rival (“negative advertising”). There is another equilibrium with either of the ﬁrms providing
a full comparison and the other doing nothing.
12The one-sided information price, given the rival sets p0 =0and that Firm 1 serves the whole market,
must ensure that 1 gets on board the consumer who least likes it, which is r0 = −1
2; this means a price of
Q − 1/2 (since 1 delivers expected utility zero to all). Of course, this is less attractive than no information,
whereby the price charged is Q (with no product diﬀerentiation, the keel is even).
13Equilibrium strategies cannot involve Firm 1 giving a full comparison and 0 doing nothing, since 1 would
deviate to advertising nothing at all. Nor can they involve negative advertising by either alone: both prefer
full information to one-sided information, which outcome they can get by either full comparative advertising
or indeed reciprocal neagative advertising.
26advertising allows a weak ﬁrm to survive against the optimality rule.14
Finally, note that (using the price expressions in the Appendix) as Q becomes large, the
full information price for Firm 1 goes to Q − 1, whereas its one-sided information price is
Q − 1
2. This shows that the full information price can be lower for the high quality ﬁrm.
Moreover, consumer surplus is higher under full information. Under one-sided information
all consumers buy from Firm 1, whereas under full information those who still buy from
F i r m1p a yal o w e rp r i c ea n dt h o s ec h o o s et ob u yf r o mF i r m0a r eb e t t e ro ﬀ.
6D i s c u s s i o n
It was assumed above that the good advertised is an experience good, and that qualities are
known to consumers beforehand. We ﬁrst show that the results hold too when the good is
a search good as long as search costs are high enough. We then show that if qualities are
known to ﬁrms but not consumers, and ﬁrms can advertise quality information, then ﬁrms
will advertise qualities, so the basic set-up still holds.
6.1 A search good
Suppose that a consumer can observe the product’s attributes before making a purchase at
cost c>b . She must incur the visit cost c to buy from either ﬁrm, but the cost of the ﬁrst
visit is irrelevant since the consumer must buy one of the two products in any case. We now
show that demands are exactly the same as with the experience good version of the model
(and so prices and equilibria are too). This we do by showing that the consumer always
buys from the ﬁrst ﬁrm she visits so that the information she obtains when she gets there is
irrelevant.
Consider a consumer who, after observing prices and advertised information, decides to
14Comparative ads more generally might facilitate toe-hold entry for entrants to become larger later, and
this could be desirable in an extended context.
27visit Firm i ﬁrst. If information about product i was provided through advertising, then
the consumer has not learned anything from her ﬁrst visit and she will clearly choose to
buy product i given that she initially chose to visit Firm i. Let us thus assume that ri was
unknown to her when she chose to visit Firm i.Aﬁrst possibility is that she was informed
about her match with the other product when she made that choice. A standard sequential
search argument shows that she would then have chosen to incur search cost c to ﬁnd out
about ri, if and only if her match with the competing product (rj, j 6= i) augmented by the
price diﬀerence pi − pj − c is strictly less than −c<−b.15 She will then choose to purchase
product i even if she ﬁnds out that ri = −b. Suppose ﬁnally that neither product was known
when the consumer decided on her ﬁrst visit. Since she chose to visit Firm i ﬁrst, we must
have pi ≤ pj. Then the search theoretic argument used above shows that, when she ﬁnds out
her match with product i, for any ri, she will not visit Firm j:s i n c eri +pj −pi ≥− b>−c
it is not worth incurring search cost c to ﬁnd out about rj.16 The ability of the consumer
to obtain product information which has not been advertised before buying therefore has no
impact on her choice of product since it would be too costly to use that information.
In an earlier version of this paper, we studied product information disclosure with a search
good. Assuming that only one of the two products is unknown, we found that the ﬁrm selling
the unknown product would disclose horizontal attributes if and only if its quality is below
the other product’s. Furthermore, a known product with low quality uses comparative adver-
tising (if allowed) to disclose information about an unknown high quality product.17 Hence
the predictions of the model with search (and only one product unknown), are qualitatively
similar to those derived in the present paper.
15Here pj + c i st h ep r i c eo ft h ek n o w np r o d u c tj.
16Here the price of the known product is pi since the cost of visiting Firm i is already sunk. Furthermore,
the exact condition used here assumes that recalling Firm i’s oﬀer after visiting Firm j has no cost.
17These results hold as long as a pure strategy equilibrium exists, which is not necessarily the case for all
search cost values or quality diﬀerences.
286.2 Quality disclosure
Let us now consider the possibility that qualities as well as horizontal attributes are un-
known. A standard result in the literature due to Milgrom (1981) and Grossman (1981), is
that a monopoly ﬁrm that may disclose certiﬁable information about its product’s quality,
always discloses it in equilibrium. We now show that practically the same result holds for
our duopoly setting with horizontal diﬀerentiation as well as vertical (quality). Assume that
qualities for the two ﬁrms are independently drawn from the same distribution and that real-
izations are initially known only by ﬁr m s .F i r s tn o t et h a tn oi n f o r m a t i o nd i s c l o s u r ei sn o ta n
equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, ﬁrms would engage in symmetric Bertrand competition
in the second stage and earn zero proﬁt. It would be proﬁtable for a ﬁrm to deviate and
disclose its horizontal attributes thus creating some product diﬀerentiation. Second, there is
no equilibrium where only the low quality ﬁrm discloses its quality. Recall that, independent
of what information is revealed about horizontal attributes, the high quality ﬁrm earns some
strictly positive proﬁt that is strictly increasing in its quality. Suppose that for some given
low quality and horizontal attributes information disclosed, there is some non-zero subset of
high qualities that are not disclosed in equilibrium. The consumers form some conditional
expectation as to the quality of a ﬁrm that does not disclose so that any ﬁrm with a quality
above that conditional expectation is better oﬀ disclosing its quality.
Now consider the choice of a low quality ﬁrm. With no horizontal attributes disclosed
or if only one product’s attributes are disclosed and the quality diﬀerence is large enough,
it earns zero proﬁts. Otherwise, its proﬁt is strictly positive and strictly increasing in its
quality (Corollary 2). Whenever the latter situation arises, then an argument analogous to
that used for the high quality ﬁrm shows that the low quality is always revealed. The only
situation when the low quality ﬁrm cannot guarantee itself some strictly positive proﬁti s
when the quality diﬀerence is very large and comparative advertising is not allowed. Then,
29the low quality is not disclosed but consumers update their beliefs accordingly and anticipate
the low quality is very low relative to the high quality. The only information disclosed in
that case is the higher quality and the high quality ﬁrm serves the whole market.
T os u m m a r i z e ,t h eo n l ys i t u a t i o nw h e r et h em a r k e to u t c o m ew o u l dn o tb ef u l l yi d e n t i c a l
to that obtained while assuming that qualities are known is when the quality diﬀerence is
large and comparative advertising is not allowed. Then the low quality is not revealed but it
is anticipated by consumers to be much lower than the high quality. The market outcome is
qualitatively similar to that derived in previous sections where the quality diﬀerence should
be replaced by the diﬀerence between the high quality and some expected low quality.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
Comparative advertising involves informing consumers of characteristics of rival products.
On the surface, the practice would appear socially beneﬁcial (assuming of course that the
advertising is not misleading) and should lead to better informed choices. It has though
been pointed out that it may relax price competition (and lead to higher prices) because it
increases product diﬀerentiation. However, this is also true for direct advertising, so a useful
theory should also explain when it is used and not.
The theory proposed here does this by focussing on intrinsic quality diﬀerences in the
products sold. If these qualities are quite similar, ﬁrms have enough incentive to advertise
their own products and comparative advertising plays no role. This is true in a balanced
market with ﬁrms that have similar market shares. Only if product qualities or marginal
production costs are suﬃciently diﬀerent does the ability to use comparative advertising
come into play. If it is illegal, the dominant product can serve the market without needing
to advertise, and the minor product may be overwhelmed. If comparative advertising is legal
though, the minor product can improve its consumer base and survive by using advertising
30that targets the dominant product and compares characteristics. Thus, the model predicts
that comparative advertising is used by weaker ﬁrms targeting market leaders. There is some
empirical support for the contention that the market leader does not engage in comparative
advertising, but those just behind it do. Tylenol has 25% of the market for over-the-counter
pain relievers, and does no comparative advertising regarding the other OTC medicines.
Advil, in second place with 15% of the market, spends over half (58%) of its advertising
budget on comparative ads, mainly about Tylenol.
The model also delivers a salutary message for comparative advertising. It enables weaker
ﬁrms to survive through an equilibrium pricing distortion whereby the stronger ﬁrm over-
prices its product. The dominant ﬁrm eﬀectively parlays its quality advantage into both a
high mark-up and high sales. The paper shows that this distortion can be suﬃciently acute
that it overwhelms the informational beneﬁts of comparative advertising. However, some
caveats are worth drawing. First, even when total welfare falls, it may be that consumer
welfare rises since comparative advertising (full information) may be associated with lower
prices when quality (or cost) diﬀerences are large enough. Second, such lower prices might
entail a lower deadweight loss if the model were extended to allow for non-purchase options.
The modeling approach is based on truthful informative advertising of horizontal charac-
teristics with rational consumers. The approach was chosen to portray comparative adver-
tising in a favorable light by allowing the conveyance of more hard information. If consumers
were not rational (rationality is embodied in the model in the assumption that consumers
form correct expectations of mean valuations in the absence of information), they might be
manipulated by misleading advertising. The legal system may play an important role in
ensuring truthfulness in this context.
We have also assumed that ﬁrms only are able to convey full information or else none
at all. Partial information (in a monopoly context) is addressed in Anderson and Renault
(2006). The information portrayed here was assumed to be perfectly certiﬁable at no cost.
31An approach to be investigated in future research is to allow for imperfect certiﬁcation (see
Shin, 1994) and/or costly certiﬁcation. Finally, advertising has been assumed to reach all
consumers costlessly. Introducing costly reach would be another worthwhile extension to the
model.
References
[1] Aluf, Yana, and Oz Shy (2001) Comparison advertising and competition. Mimeo, Uni-
versity of Haifa.
[2] Anderson, Simon P. and André de Palma (1988): Spatial Price Discrimination with
Heterogeneous Products. Review of Economic Studies, 55, 573 592.
[3] Anderson, Simon P. and André de Palma (2001): Product Diversity in Asymmetric
Oligopoly: Is the Quality of Consumer Goods Too Low? Journal of Industrial Eco-
nomics, 49, 113-135.
[4] Anderson, Simon P. and Renault, Régis (1999): Pricing, Product Diversity and Search
Costs: a Bertrand-Chamberlin-Diamond Model. RAND Journal of Economics, 30, 719-
735.
[5] Anderson, Simon P. and Renault, Régis (2000): Consumer Information and Firm Pric-
ing: Negative Externalities from Improved Information. International Economic Review,
31, 721-741.
[6] Anderson, Simon P. and Renault, Régis (2006): Advertising content. American Eco-
nomic Review, 96, 93-113.
[7] Bagwell, Kyle (2006): The Economic Analysis of Advertising. Mimeo, Columbia Uni-
versity.
32[8] Barigozzi, Francesca, Paolo Garella, and Martin Peitz (2006): With a little help from
my enemy: comparative vs. generic advertising. Mimeo, University of Bologna.
[9] Barigozzi, Francesca and Martin Peitz (2005): Comparative advertising and competition
policy. Forthcoming in Recent Developments in Antitrust Analysis,e d i t e db yJ a yP i l
Choi, MIT Press.
[10] Butters, Gerard R. (1977): Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and Advertising Prices.
Review of Economic Studies, 44, 465-491.
[11] Donthu, Naveen (1998): A cross-country investigation of and attitude toward compar-
ative advertising. Journal of Advertising, 27, 111-133.
[12] Grewal, Dhruv, Sukumar Kavanoor, Edward F. Fern, Carolyn Costley, and James
Barnes (1997): Comparative versus noncomparative advertising: a meta-analysis. Jour-
nal of Marketing, 61, 1-15.
[13] Grossman, Gene M. and Shapiro, Carl (1984): Informative Advertising and Diﬀerenti-
ated Products. Review of Economic Studies, 51, 63-81.
[14] Grossman, Sanford J. (1981): The informational role of warranties and private disclosure
about product quality. Journal of Law and Economics 24(3), 461-83.
[15] Liaukonyte, Jura (2006): Is comparative advertising an active ingredient in the market
for pain relief? Mimeo, University of Virginia.
[16] Meurer, Michael J., and Stahl, Dale O., II (1994): Informative Advertising and Product
Match. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 12, 1-19.
[17] Milgrom, Paul R. (1981): Good news, bad news: representation theorems and applica-
tions. Bell Journal of Economics, 12, 380-391.
33[18] Nelson, Phillip J. (1974): Advertising as information. Journal of Political Economy.8 2 ,
729-754.
[19] Shin, Hyun (1994): The Burden of Proof in a Game of Persuasion. Journal of Economic
Theory, 64, 253-263.
[20] Thompson, Debora Viana and Rebecca W. Hamilton (2006): The eﬀects of informa-
tion processing mode on consumers’ responses to comparative advertising. Journal of
Consumer Research, 32, 530-540.
[21] Wolinsky, Asher (1986): True Monopolistic Competition as a Result of Imperfect Infor-
mation. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1 0 1 ,4 9 3 - 5 1 1 .
34Appendix
8 Proofs from Section 2
8.1 Lemma 1
Assume that Q ≥ 0.W eﬁrst show that ∆ = Q or ∆ =0imply that Q =0 . Assume ﬁrst
that ∆ = Q,s ot h a tp0 = p1 = p. Then, in order for Firm 0 not to wish to deviate, for any
real number δ ≥− p we must have
p[1 − D1(Q)] ≥ (p + δ)[1 − D1(Q + δ)],
which is equivalent to
(p − δ)D1(Q + δ) ≥ pD1(Q)+δ[1 − 2D1(Q + δ)].
If Q>0,t h e nf o ra n yδ ∈ (−Q,0], D1(Q + δ) > 1
2 and thus δ[1 − 2D1(Q + δ)] > 0.T h e n
Firm 1 could deviate from p to p−δ so as to earn a proﬁto f(p−δ)D1(Q+δ) which strictly
exceeds pD1(q).S ow em u s th a v eQ =0in order for ∆ to be equal to Q in equilibrium.
Now suppose that ∆ =0so that p0 = p1 − Q. Then, for any δ>0 we must have
1
2
(p1 − Q) ≥ (p1 − Q + δ)[1 − D1(δ)],
or, equivalently,
(p1 − δ)D1(δ) ≥
1
2




If Q>0,s i n c eδ>0 so that D1(δ) > 1
2,f o rδ suﬃciently small, the right hand side strictly
exceeds 1
2p1. Firm 1 would therefore be better oﬀ charging p1 − δ rather than p1.T h u si n
order for ∆ to be zero in equilibrium we must have Q =0 .
We now show that in equilibrium 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ Q which, along with the results above, proves
the Lemma for Q ≥ 0. First, it is necessary that Firm i prefers pi to its rival’s price so that
p0[1 − D1(∆)] ≥ p1[1 − D1(Q)]
35and
p1D1(∆) ≥ p0D1(Q).
Adding these two inequalities and rearranging yields
p0 − p1 ≥ (p0 − p1)[D1(Q)+D1(∆)]. (9)
Since Q ≥ 0,i fp0 >p 1,t h e nD1(∆) >D 1(Q) ≥ 1
2.T h u s D1(Q)+D1(∆) > 1 which
contradicts inequality (9). So we must have p0 ≤ p1, or equivalently ∆ ≤ Q.
It must also be the case that Firm i prefers charging pi than a price that would set ∆ to
zero, so that









Adding these two inequalities yields
[1 − D1(∆)]p0 + D1(∆)p1 ≥
1
2
(p0 + p1). (10)
We know from above that p1 ≥ p0.I fp1 >p 0, inequality (10) requires that D1(∆) ≥ 1
2 and
therefore ∆ ≥ 0.I fp1 = p0 then ∆ = Q ≥ 0. This completes the proof for Q ≥ 0.
Similar arguments establish the result for Q ≤ 0. Q.E.D.
8.2 Lemma 2
If ∆ < ∆  or ∆ > ∆u, then whichever ﬁrm has a demand of 1 could increase its price without
losing any demand and thus, increase it proﬁt; this proves the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h eL e m m a .
W en o ws h o wt h a td i ﬀerentiability at ∆k implies that ∆ = ∆k cannot be an equilibrium.
For instance for k = u,d i ﬀerentiability at ∆u implies that the left derivative of D1 at ∆u is
0 (since the right derivative is zero). Then Firm 1’s proﬁt derivative is D1(∆u)=1> 0 so
that Firm 1 would deviate and increase its price. Similarly, if ∆ = ∆ ,F i r m0w o u l dw i s h
to increase its price from the candidate equilibrium. Q.E.D.
368.3 Proposition 1
The argument for existence is standard (see Caplin and Nalebuﬀ, 1991).
Before going through the 3 cases it is useful to note that since D1 and D0 =1− D1 are
strictly log-concave, g is strictly decreasing on [∆ ,∆u] and so the right-hand side of equation
(3) (the equation is Q = ∆ − g(∆)) is strictly increasing on that same interval. This shows




Di, i =0 ,1 is strictly increasing,
prices are uniquely determined by equation (1). It also shows that in this case ∆ must be
strictly increasing in Q. Implicit diﬀerentiation of (3) and Assumption 2 imply d∆
dQ < 1.
First consider case 3.I f∆ ≤ ∆ ,t h e nF i r m1m a k e sz e r op r o ﬁtw h e r e a s ,s i n c eQ>0.
it could obtain a strictly positive proﬁt by charging, for instance, a price p0 + Q>0.N e x t
note that ∆u + 1
D
0
1(∆u) is the right-hand side of (3) evaluated at ∆ = ∆u.S i n c e Q is at
least as large and the right-hand side of (3) is strictly increasing on (∆ ,∆u), there is no ∆
in that interval that satisﬁes (3). Since an equilibrium exists and using Lemma 2, we must
have ∆ = ∆u.W ea l s ok n o wf r o mL e m m a2t h a tt h i sc a s em a ya r i s eo n l yi fD
0
1(∆u) > 0 so
that Firm 0’s proﬁtl e f td e r i v a t i v ew i t hr e s p e c tt op0 is −p0D
0
1(∆u) which would be negative
if p0 > 0 and thus Firm 0 would wish to decrease its price. Thus we have p0 =0and the
expression for p1 follows.
Case 2 may be treated with symmetric arguments.
Now consider case 1.W es h o wt h a tw em a yn o th a v e∆ = ∆u and a symmetric argument
would show that we cannot have ∆ = ∆ . From Lemma 2, this suﬃces to complete the
proof. Hence suppose that ∆ = ∆u.A sw a ss h o w na b o v e ,w em u s tt h e nh a v ep0 =0 .T h e
right derivative of Firm 1’s proﬁti sg i v e nb y1 − p1D
0
1(∆u)=1− (Q − ∆u)D
0




1(∆u) the right derivative of proﬁt strictly exceeds 0. Then Firm 1 could
increase its proﬁtb yi n c r e a s i n gi t sp r i c e .Q . E . D .
378.4 Proposition 2
From symmetry of f, equality clearly holds if ∆ =0 . We now show that the inequality holds
strictly for ∆ > 0. Symmetry of f implies
Z b
−b
F(r + ∆)f(r)dr =
Z 0
−b






H e n c ei ts u ﬃces to establish that F(r + ∆)+F(−r + ∆) < 2F(∆) for all r<0.T h i s i s
equivalent to








Using appropriate changes of variables, this condition may be rewritten as
Z −r
0




Since ∆ > 0, quasi-concavity and symmetry of f around zero implies that f(∆+t) <f(∆−t),
for all t ∈ (0,−r]. This ensures the proper inequality.
Symmetric arguments establish reverse inequalities for ∆ < 0. Q.E.D.
8.5 Pricing expressions for the uniform density







, and zero otherwise.
8.6 One-sided information
Since ¯ D1(∆)=F (∆) in general, for the uniform density we have ¯ D1(∆)=1







and ¯ D1(∆) is zero below the lower bound and one above the upper bound.
38When within the bounds, ¯ D0
1 = −1, so we have a simple linear demand system.18














These prices depend only on net quality diﬀerences so we may apply Lemma 1.
Taking the diﬀerence of these two equations we can write out and solve for ∆ = Q/3.














which therefore hold for the interior regime, with ∆ = Q+p0−p1 = Q/3 (which is consistent
with Lemma 1): so that this regime applies when Q<3/2 (recall Q>0). Equilibrium proﬁt
levels are given by these prices squared (as is standard for linear demands with unit slopes).
Otherwise, for Q ≥ 3/2,w eh a v e




Here the quality-advantaged ﬁrm prices so as to just retain the individual retaining the
highest regard for Firm 0, which is the individual who has a match r0 =1 , which compares
to the mean value of 0 for Firm 1.19
8.7 Full information













+ r1 + ∆
¶
dr1 + ∆ =
1+2 ∆ − ∆2
2
18The "symmetric" version, with consumers knowing their valuations at both ﬁrms, does NOT give a
linear demand system. This latter system is determined in the text below.
19Equivalently, as per Lemma 3, if Firm 1 reveals its match information while Firm 0 does not, 1 must
price so that the consumer least enamoured of it (holding r1 =0 ) nonetheless buys against an expected value
of 0 with Firm 0.
39Notice that ∆ < 1 for both ﬁr m st oh a v ep o s i t i v ed e m a n d s :f o r∆ > 1,F i r m1’s demand




Since evaluations for the two products are i.i.d. we have e D1(0) = 1
2, and all assumptions of
L e m m a5a r es a t i s ﬁed. Thus the ﬁrm with the higher quality will set a higher net quality
and thus garner a larger share of demand, even though it charges the higher price.21
We now ﬁnd the equilibrium prices conditional on consumers knowing product speciﬁca-
tions and qualities of both products (Perloﬀ-Salop, uniform distribution, with asymmetric
qualities, eﬀectively). Since e D0 (∆)=
(1−∆)2





we can immediately substitute in for ∆ = Q + p0 − p1 to yield a linear reaction function
p0 =
1 − Q + p1
3
.
For Firm 1, we have the ﬁrst order condition 1 −
(1−∆)2
2 − p1 (1 − ∆)=0 .
Substituting in p0 =
(1−∆)
2 ,t h e n1 − 2p2
0 − 2p0p1 =0 .














where ˆ ω =1− Q. Note that these prices are equal at ˆ ω =1(symmetry) to one half. They
also verify ∆ > 0,a sd e s i r e d .
20Demand is convex for ∆ < 0 (high prices for Firm 1) and concave for ∆ > 0 (low prices). The demand
derivative is continuous on its support, and so there is no kink.
21Any best reply price for Firm 1 must satisfy p1 ∈ [0,p 0 + q1 − q0 − 1], where the upper bound is where
Firm 1’s demand disappears. Hence Firm 1’s proﬁt is a continuous function that is deﬁned over a compact
set, and so has a maximum. Equilibrium existence follows from Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1991).
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